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The Fourth Amendment and Terrorism
John M. Burkoff*
We fought and won a Revolutionary War in large part because of
our forefathers' and foremothers' experience with-and their anger
The
about-the arbitrary and oppressive use of general warrants.'
resulting constitutional restrictions on unreasonable searches and
seizures generally, and on the use of warrants specifically, that are
memorialized in our Fourth Amendment reflect, therefore, an important
and indeed a critical and compelling part of our history as a nation.
Moreover, these particular restrictions and the historic events that
engendered them continue to play an important role in defining our
national identity and character and in guiding our interpretation of the
meaning of our constitutional democracy.
This point was, perhaps, made most artfully by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in a 1950 dissenting opinion. Objecting to approval of the
warrantless search of a small-time criminal's office, files, and papers by
a majority of his Brethren, Justice Frankfurter eloquently observed that:
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty
have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby
defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really
the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment. A disregard
of the historic materials underlying the Amendment does not answer
them.
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. An earlier version of this paper was
delivered at the Criminal Procedure Forum sponsored by the law schools at the
University of Louisville, Vanderbilt University, and Washington & Lee University and
held at the University of Louisville on November 13, 2004. It also includes some
material taken from the author's inaugural James Otis Lecture, sponsored by the National
Center for Justice and the Rule of Law and the University of Mississippi School of Law,
and delivered at the University of Mississippi School of Law on February 4, 2004. An

expanded version of that lecture is to be published in the MississippiLaw Journalunder

the title "'A Flame of Fire': The Fourth Amendment in Perilous Times." The portions of
that article reprinted herein are reprinted by permission of the MississippiLaw Journal.
1. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) ("The writs of
assistance.., were the principal grievance against which the Fourth Amendment was

directed.").
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It is true... of journeys in the law that the place you reach depends
on the direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out in a
case depends on where one goes in. It makes all the difference in the
world whether one approaches the Fourth Amendment as the Court
approached it in [its prior decisions on the importance of Fourth
Amendment protections], or one approaches it as a provision dealing
with a formality. It makes all the difference in the world whether one
recognizes the centralfact about the Fourth Amendment, namely,
that it was a safeguard againstrecurrence of abuses so deeply felt by
the colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution,
or
2
one thinks of it as merely a requirementfor apiece ofpaper.
In short, the protections enshrined in the Fourth Amendment are
important not only because they are the law, and not only because they
are a part of our Bill of Rights, but also because they are a vital and
significant part of our history, our self-identity, our democracy, and our
national culture.
Of course, stated this way, this argument should not be very
controversial. It is an easy point to make; at least, it is easy in the
abstract. Everybody, surely every American-Democrat or Republican,
liberal or conservative-is for the Constitution, and for the Bill of
Rights, and for liberty and justice for all, and for all of the rest of the
supposed American virtues that we freely espouse and hold so dear. This
is particularly true when it doesn't "cost us anything" to be for them.
But, what happens when there are costs? And what happens when those
costs are high?
Do and should and must these storied Fourth
Amendment protections apply in the same fashion not only to our
government's pursuit of run-of-the-mill criminals but also to its task of
detecting and neutralizing terrorists and suspected terrorists-individuals
who are committing, who have committed, or who may be poised to
commit acts aimed at the destruction of extremely large numbers of
people?
For many, if not for most Americans, the answer to these questions
involving the scope of the Fourth Amendment's putative applicability to
terrorists (and, perhaps more importantly, to suspected terrorists) is
absolutely clear and compelling. But, in my experience, there are two
entirely different, but nonetheless absolutely-clear-and-compelling
answers to questions of this sort. Moreover, proponents of each of these
two absolutely-clear-and-compelling answers often claim, expressly or
implicitly, that their answer is the only "true" answer, although each is
ostensibly the polar opposite of the other.
The two answers go something like this:

2.

U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (emphasis added).
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Answer #1: Of course, the Fourth Amendment applies to everyone (at
least to every American and to any individual searched or seized on
American soil) if they are suspected of any sort of crime, whether
trivial or horrific. The consequences of ignoring our own history and
constitutional principles may be dramatic. As Justice Frankfurter
explained, "[i]t makes all the difference in the world whether one
recognizes the central fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that
it was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the
colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution. 3
Answer #2: Idealism is great, but dead people don't have the luxury
of being idealistic. As Justice Robert Jackson, who felt as strongly
about Fourth Amendment values as did Justice Frankfurter,
nonetheless warned in 1949, the Bill of Rights should not be
converted into a "suicide pact."4 We cannot allow terrorists to use
our democratic strengths as weapons against us and harm or defeat us
because of our own inability to act.
There is, of course, nothing new in recognizing that these two
competing points of view as to the respective importance of liberty and
security exist. In 1798, James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson that
"[p]erhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be
charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad." 5
Jefferson, in contrast, warned a dozen years later, in 1810, that "[t]o lose
our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law would be to lose
3. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 2.
4. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 35 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Justice Jackson, a former Attorney General and Solicitor General of the United States,
left the Court for its entire 1945 Term in order to serve by Presidential appointment as
Chief American Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal, where he tried captured senior
Nazi leaders for genocide and war crimes. He had the following to say about the
importance of Fourth Amendment freedoms to our American democracy, after returning
from Nuremberg:
These ... are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of
indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in
cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in
every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need
only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many
admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human
personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes,
persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and
seizure by the police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("[W]hile the Constitution
protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.").
5. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), in PHILIP B.
HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR, at xi (2003)
[hereinafter HEYMANN].
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the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying
them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means."6
How do we deal with such dramatically different points of view?
More to the point, what does the Fourth Amendment mean in perilous
times, times when the threat to our nation and to our national identity and
security are concrete and imminent, not speculative or distant?
If we can manage to ignore the significant undertones of political
partisanship that underlie the answers to these questions, I would suggest
that both of the pat and reflexive answers that I have posed may be
"correct."
Indeed, I argue that they are in fact both "correct" in
significant and perhaps somewhat less rhetorical ways.
I believe strongly, as I have already demonstrated, that the Fourth
Amendment is more than just a simple legal interdiction. Fourth
Amendment protections (and values) are also an important part of our
national fabric and accordingly, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
reminded us in 1920, we dare not risk treating these strictures with
indifference, as a mere "form of words." 7
Moreover, it is clear that the Framers understood perfectly well that
the prohibitions on law enforcement activity contained in the Fourth
Amendment would make it more difficult to fight crime. Fighting crime,
terrorism or not, would certainly be easier (and maybe, but not
necessarily, more effective) if no rules restraining our law enforcement
agents existed at all, if they were authorized, as British customs officials
were in the colonial, pre-Revolutionary days, to use something like the
old writs of assistance, empowering them to search and seize whoever
and whenever and wherever they wanted. Indeed, wouldn't the war
against terror (and crime-fighting generally) be easier if law enforcement
agents could also interrogate and even coerce whoever they wanted for
whatever length of time they wanted ard in whatever manner they
wanted?
But even if it were true that the use of such overzealous crimefighting techniques would actually help us fight the threat of terrorism,8
this is not the sort of governmental overreaching that our laws, our
history, our self-identity, our democracy, and our national culture permit.
As Professor Philip Heymann has sensibly warned, "[e]ven what is
effective in protecting the safety of American citizens and their property
may be unwise because of its effects on the historic set of arrangements

6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (September 20, 1810), in
HEYMANN, supra note 5, at xi.
7. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
8. This may well be a dubious assumption. See, e.g., John M. Burkoff, Defeating
Terrorism Without Fightinga War, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS (Winter 2005).
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which have preserved our democratic liberties." 9 I have worked in
countries where torture was a standard and pervasive part of law
enforcement activity. Sadly, this kind of horrible inhumanity happens.
But, of course, our laws, our Constitution, our history, and our national
character and identity make that impossible. Impossible, lest we become
something that we are not, another country with another culture and
character, divorced from our history.
But, is this just an ivory-tower pipe dream? Does the shocking
misconduct of some American military reservists at Abu Ghraib prison in
Baghdad and elsewhere, for example, reflect a sea change in our
culture?' 0 Have I been describing our constitutional history as living,
when in fact it was really an historical artifact? This is indeed a chilling
thought. Has the fear of terrorism reached such heights that Americans
or our leaders now stand willing to make such dramatic changes in our
society because of the horrifying belief that only the use of inhumane and
otherwise unconstitutional methods of fighting our enemies can defeat
such an implacable foe?
For myself, I believe that such a desperate response is not only unAmerican in the fullest sense of that word, but unnecessary as well. The
Bill of Rights does not emasculate us. And the Fourth Amendment was
not intended-and should not be interpreted-to make it impossible to
protect ourselves from the very real and very substantial threat that we
face today from bona fide terrorists and terrorist groups, individuals and
groups whose aim is sometimes genocidal and who appear bent upon our
destruction as a culture and a nation.
That said, it is critically important not to sacrifice our constitutional
heritage and constitutional structure to the perceived dangers of the
moment. As Chief Justice William Rehnquist warned in a recent book, it
"is all too easy to slide from a case of genuine military necessity ...to
one where the threat is not critical and the power [sought to be exercised
is] either dubious or nonexistent." ' No consideration relevant to the
Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational differentiation
between, for example, an individual who seeks to plant a bomb in order
to make a political point and an individual who does so in order to
accomplish some purely criminal aim in pursuit of an entirely nonpolitical goal (e.g., wealth).
Furthermore, one would have hoped that we had learned from the
9.

HEYMANN, supra note 5, at 87.

10. See, e.g., Josh White, Ex-Guardto FaceMore Charges, THE WASHINGTON POST,
July 9, 2004, at A 16 (discussing the torture by American troops at Abu Ghraib Prison in

Iraq). See also Scott Higham et. al., Dates on PrisonPhotos Show Two Phasesof Abuse,
THE WASHINGTON POST, June 1, 2004, at Al.
11.

WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 224-25 (2000).
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events giving rise to the Korematsu decision,12 when more than 100,000
people living in the United States, many of them Japanese-American
citizens, were interned ("seized") without the appropriate antecedent
justification ordinarily required by the Fourth Amendment.
This
occurred, of course, at the beginning of World War II, out of stereotypic
but unproven fears of the possible complicity of these individuals with a
hostile power with which we were then at war. Such an extraordinary
response-essentially suspending or ignoring constitutional protections
in perilous times, even in times of legitimate and serious threat to our
national security-was not only ineffective in insuring our safety and
security, was counterproductive in that it was destructive of our
constitutional fabric and of our self-congratulatory claims that we are a
nation of democratic virtues governed by the fair and even-handed
application of the rule of law. As Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out,
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.
The World War II relocation-camp cases ... are only the most
extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be
sacrificed in the name
of real or perceived exigency, we invariably
3

come to regret

it.1

The same question recurs in our post 9/11 world. We must ask
ourselves whether the situation we face today is somehow qualitatively
different from the perils faced by Americans in the past. Given concerns
of the stature and significance of the current genocidal threats of
terrorism and given the means that could be used by terrorists in carrying
out those threats, what weight, if any, should the gravity of the crimes
under investigation or feared to be imminent play in Fourth Amendment
analysis?
12. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S.Ct. 2633 (2004) (discussing the Korernatsu decision and its legacy); see also
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
13. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)
(Marshall, J. dissenting). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004)
(plurality opinion) ("[A]s critical as the Government's interest may be in detaining those
who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during
ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of
others who do not present that sort of threat."); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2735
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of
investigating and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber.");
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866) ("[The Founders] knew-the history of the
world told them-the nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be
involved in war; how often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and
that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to

freemen").
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In a number of decisions handed down during its October 2003
term, the Supreme Court signaled to us its answer to this question. It is
an answer that purports, if only implicitly, to recognize and accept both
of the competing views I earlier described. And it is an answer that
defines the contours of the way in which the Court will deal with the
terrorism-related Fourth Amendment cases that will, in all likelihood,
eventually reach its docket. A brief discussion of just one of these cases,
Maryland v. Pringle,14 will illustrate my point.
There is a significant doctrinal background to the Pringle decision.
In 2001, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,15 a narrow five-to-four
majority of the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
requirement applies in precisely the same way to all criminal offenses,
whether they are grave or trivial. More specifically, the Atwater Court
specifically declined to craft any special Fourth Amendment rule for
minor offenders like Gail Atwater, the defendant in that particular case.
Atwater, who, in the extensive media accounts of the case, was often
referred to as a "soccer mom,

'1 6

was arrested and dragged off to jail

because she and her two small children were observed by a police officer
(who allegedly held a grudge against her) driving in her pick-up truck
without wearing their seat belts.
Not wearing a seatbelt is obviously not an offense of the same
gravity as high-jacking an airplane or planting a bomb. But it is
nonetheless a crime in Texas, albeit a minor one, punishable only by a
small fine. And, as the bare five-justice majority of the Court in Atwater
sternly admonished us,
[T]he standard of probable cause "applie[s] to all arrests, without the
need to 'balance' the interests and circumstances involved in
particular situations.". . . If an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense
in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,
arrest the offender."7

14. A fuller discussion of all of these decisions can be found in the Mississippi Law
Journalarticle from which this excerpt is adapted. See supra text accompanying note *.
15. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).

16. It was a much simpler time. These were the days before the events of September
11, 2001 resulted in the supposed creation of a newer category of "security moms." See,
e.g., Michelle Malkin, Candidates Ignore 'Security Moms' at their Peril, USA TODAY,
July 21, 2004, at A 1l,available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/
2004-07-20-malkin-x.htm; The Word Spy, http://www.wordspy.com/words/security

mom.asp (defining security mom as "[a] woman with children who believes the most
important issue of the day is national security, particularly the fight against terrorism.")
(last visited January 5, 2005).
17. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S at 354 (emphasis added) (quoting Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).

[Vol. 109:4
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In short, Atwater may have been just a non-seatbelt-wearing soccer
Mom, but, at least in Texas, she was still a criminal. And criminals,
minor or not, can be arrested and carted away to jail. Although, to be
fair, the Atwater majority thought that Gail Atwater should not have been
taken to jail, it, nonetheless, held that the State of Texas, in its wisdom,
could send her to jail lawfully under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor dissented. Standing up for all of the
criminal soccer moms in America, undoubtedly a sizeable group, Justice
O'Connor argued-along with three other justices-that while Atwater's
violation of a minor, "fine-only offense," like the Texas seat-belt law,
indeed justified her arrest,it did not justify a full-custody arrest. In other
words, four justices took issue with the Atwater majority's vision of an
inflexible Fourth Amendment that permits the government to make a full
custodial arrest in any and all instances in which any criminal law,
however trivial, is broken.
Justice O'Connor reasoned as follows:
The majority insists that a bright-line rule focused on probable cause
is necessary to vindicate the State's interest in easily administrable
law enforcement rules. Probable cause itself, however, is not a model
of precision. "The quantum of information which constitutes
probable cause--evidence which would 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that a [crime] has been committed-must be
measured by the facts of the particular case.".

.

. The rule I

propose-which merely requires a legitimate reason for the decision
to escalate the seizure into a full custodial arrest-thus does not
undermine an otherwise "clear and simple" rule.
While clarity is certainly a value worthy of consideration in our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it by no means.trumps the values
18
of liberty and privacy at the heart of the Amendment's protections.
Of course, this language was written in dissent. It did not carry the day.
But Justice O'Connor's point-that Fourth Amendment probable cause
analysis is not clear and simple and that it does not and should not apply
in precisely the same fashion in every case-would appear to have been
vindicated, albeit de facto, in the unanimous decision of the Court in
Maryland v. Pringle,handed down in December of 2 0 0 3 . 9
The Pringle decision involved the following facts. At 3:16 a.m. on
August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County Police officer stopped a Nissan
Maxima for speeding and because the driver, just like Gail Atwater, was
18. Id. at 366 (citations omitted) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963)).
19. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
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not wearing a seatbelt. There were three occupants in the car: the driver,
who owned the car; Joseph Pringle, who was a front-seat passenger; and
a third person, who was a back-seat passenger. The officer asked the
driver for his license and vehicle registration.
When the driver
responded by reaching into the glove compartment to retrieve his
registration, the officer kept his eye on him and observed a large amount
of rolled-up cash stuffed inside. The officer then returned to his patrol
car to check the police computer system for outstanding violations. The
computer check revealed nothing amiss and, as a result, the officer
returned to the stopped car, had the driver get out of it, and issued him an
oral warning.2 °
But, then the plot thickened. A second patrol car arrived, and the
newly-arrived police officer asked the driver if he had any weapons or
narcotics in his car. The driver said that he did not and consented to a
search of the vehicle. The search turned up the rolled-up cash ($763),
which had been viewed earlier in the glove compartment. More
importantly, the search also turned up five baggies of cocaine concealed
behind the backseat armrest.21
The officer then questioned all three men about the ownership of the
drugs and the money and told them that if no one admitted ownership, he
was simply going to arrest them all. Unsurprisingly, none of the men
had the foggiest idea where the drugs or money could possibly have
come from.
Nonetheless, their protestations of innocence were
unavailing, and all three were placed under arrest and taken to the station
house.2 2
Later that morning, Pringle, the front-seat passenger, changed his
story. Waiving his Miranda rights, he confessed. Pringle admitted that
the cocaine belonged to him, that he and his friends were going to a party
with it, and that he intended to either sell the cocaine there or "[u]se it [to
exchange] for sex." 23 Pringle also maintained that both the driver and the
other passenger in the car had absolutely no knowledge of these drugs,
and, ultimately, both of these other individuals were released by the
police.2 4
Prior to trial Pringle tried to suppress his confession, arguing that it
was the fruit of an illegal arrest since the officers did not have probable
cause to arrest him and take him into custody, where he subsequently
confessed. The trial court rejected this argument, ruling that the officers
did in fact possess sufficient probable cause to arrest Pringle. Thereafter,
20.

Id. at 368.

21.

Id.

22.
23.

Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 369.

24.

Id.
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he went to trial, and a jury convicted him of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced to ten
years in prison. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 5
However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that,
absent specific facts tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion
or control over the drugs, "the mere finding of cocaine in the back
armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat passenger in a car being driven
by its owner [was] insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest
for possession. ' '26 And, as to the wads of money seen by one police
officer and then found by the other officer stuffed into the glove
compartment, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that:
[A] police officer's discovery of money in a closed glove
compartment and cocaine concealed behind the rear armrest of a car
is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest of a front seat
passenger, who is not the owner
or person in control of the vehicle,
2 7for possession of the cocaine.
As a result of this ruling, Pringle's drug convictions were reversed-but
not for long.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Maryland Court of
Appeals. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, observed that:
It is uncontested in the present case that the officer, upon recovering
the five plastic glassine baggies containing suspected cocaine, had
probable cause to believe a felony had been committed ....

The sole

had probable cause
question [remaining, then,] is whether the •officer
28
to believe that Pringle committed that crime.
In answering this question in the affirmative, the Chief Justice, a member
of the five-justice majority that had upheld Gail Atwater's custodial
arrest for a minor, seatbelt offense in Atwater because of the supposed
inflexibility of Fourth Amendment probable cause, described in Pringle a
rather more malleable probable cause analysis and concluded as follows:
The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects "citizens
from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from
unfounded charges of crime," while giving "fair leeway for enforcing
the law in the community's protection."... On many occasions, we
have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a "practical,
nontechnical conception" that deals with "the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
25.

Id.

26.
27.
28.

Id. (citing Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (Md. 2002).
Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1028 (Md. 2002).
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (citation omitted).

20051

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TERRORISM

men, not legal technicians, act." . . . "[P]robable cause is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set
of legal rules."
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages because it deals
29 with probabilities and
depends on the totality of the circumstances.
Applying this "fluid" and open-ended conception of probable cause,
the Chief Justice then concluded for a unanimous Court that:
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any
or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised
dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer
could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle
committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or
jointly.3 °
Additionally, the Chief Justice added that:
The Court of Appeals of Maryland dismissed the $763 seized from
the glove compartment as a factor in the probable-cause
determination, stating that "[m]oney,
without more, is
innocuous."... The court's consideration of the money in isolation,
rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken
in light of our precedents ....
We think it is abundantly
3 clear from
the facts that this case involves more than money alone. 1
Now recall for one moment Justice O'Connor's observation-on
behalf of the four dissenters in Atwater-that "[p]robable cause ... is not
a model of precision. 'The quantum of information which constitutes
probable cause-evidence which would "warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief' that a [crime] has been committed-must be
measured by the facts of the particular case.' ' 32 Compare the Chief
Justice's observation for the unanimous Court in Pringle,two years later,
that "probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules. 33

29. Id. at 370 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949);
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983)).
30. Id. at 371-72 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 372 n.2.
32. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 366 (2001); see also supra text
accompanying note 18.
33. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003); see also supra text
accompanying note 23.
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It appears to me that whatever the continuing validity of the Atwater
majority's analysis which treated the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause standard (for post-arrest custody purposes) as static and
unchanging whatever the facts and circumstances in question, it is clear
today that the Supreme Court views probable cause through a somewhat
more pragmatic and flexible lens. In the Court's words, it views
probable cause as a "practical, nontechnical conception" that deals with
"the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
34
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.",
It is possible, of course, to distinguish Atwater from Pringle by
noting that while the Court is unwilling to compromise the State's
authority to detain and/or search small-time criminals, it is willing to
compromise the quantum of certainty required before Fourth
Amendment activity is undertaken in cases where the apparent criminal
conduct is more serious, like, for example, Joe Pringle's apparent
trafficking in cocaine.
But, in my view, Justice O'Connor simply "got it right" in Atwater,
and the Pringle decision demonstrates why. A more significant showing
beyond mere "probable cause that a crime has been committed" should
be required under the Fourth Amendment before we permit the State to
blithely toss all seatbelt law violators into jail, assuming, as in Atwater
that the state has made clear the trivial nature of the offense by declining
to permit it to be punished by any term of incarceration.
But, although I think the Chief Justice got it wrong in Atwater,
where he joined the majority, I think he got it right in Pringle, when he
concluded for a unanimous Court that the quantum of suspicion
necessary to effect a Fourth Amendment encounter needs to reflect the
necessity for "protect[ing] 'citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,' while
providing law enforcement-pragmatically-with 'fair leeway for
' 35
enforcing the law in the community's protection.'
The Pringle Court held that probable cause to arrest existed in
Pringle because there was significant and compelling evidence that all
three occupants of the car were engaged in some sort of concerted
activity related to narcotics, even though that fact could not be
established at that point in time by a preponderance of the evidence, let
alone by the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard needed to convict them
at trial. The three individuals' presence together in the car late at night,
the wads of money stashed in the glove compartment, and the presence

34. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003).
35. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003);
accompanying note 23.

see also supra text
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of the cocaine packaged individually as if for resale and distribution and
stashed covertly behind the armrest gave the arresting officers sufficient
grounds to reasonably believe that Pringle and the other two occupants of
the car were, at the very least, engaged in the joint possession of
narcotics. The fact that none of the three could or would offer an
innocent explanation for his presence in the car did not exonerate them
all, but simply added to the suspicious atmosphere.
Moreover, the seriousness of the crime at issue-possible drug
trafficking-was clearly relevant to the Pringle Court's Fourth
Amendment probable cause analysis. If, for example, the facts in
Pringle had involved three individuals observed in a non-smoking area
standing next to a single burning cigarette-butt lying on the ground, each
of whom asserted, as in Pringle, that he could not fathom how that
criminal evidence had gotten there, it would appear to me that there
would have been insufficientjustification for making an arrest or a search
of any or all of these individuals, despite the Atwater majority's
professed (but now dated) disinclination to distinguish major from minor
crimes. This is especially true when one recognizes the necessity for
"protect[ing] 'citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,' while giving
'fair leeway
36
for enforcing the law in the community's protection."'
But, I believe this conclusion would (and should) change once
again, when the smoking object on the floor is not a cigarette, but a
smoking gun lying next to a dead body, with three individuals just
standing around, professing no knowledge whatsoever of what has
occurred. In that case, it appears to me-and I am more certain than ever
after Pringle that the Supreme Court would agree-that there is more
than sufficient lawful and constitutional justification for arresting
(although not for convicting) any or all of these three individuals.
Similarly, if law enforcement authorities reasonably believe that a
terrorist act is imminent-that someone is transporting explosives in a
vehicle in order to stage a suicide attack on a building, for example-it
appears to me to be clear that the requisite antecedent justification (if
any) necessary to undertake law enforcement activity subject to the
Fourth Amendment would and should be assessed with full consideration
of that grave and cataclysmic context. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
already noted-albeit in obiter dictum-that suspicionless checkpoint
stops that would otherwise be unconstitutional are nonetheless justified
in "emergency" situations, explicitly including checkpoints established in

36. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003); see also supra text
accompanying note 23.
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response to "an imminent terrorist attack., 37 This prescient statement
was made more than a year before the tragic events of September 11,
2001, took place.
More recently, in the context of assessing the constitutionality of
suspicionless canine sniffs after September 11, 2001, Justice Souter
candidly admitted that:
All of us are concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority to detect
explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might
be carried by a terrorist who prompts no individualized suspicion.
Suffice it to say here that what is a reasonable search depends in part
on demonstrated risk. Unreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are
not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for
38 destructive or deadly
material if suicide bombs are a societal risk.
We are simply not talking about unfastened seatbelts any more. The
Fourth Amendment should-and must-be applied, in the Pringle
Court's words, "practical ly]," "nontechnical[ly]," and in a manner "that
deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.",39 Our

"everyday life" today includes-most regrettably and tragically, but
nonetheless "factually and practically"-the specter of devastating acts
of terrorist criminality that raise the possibility of massive destruction
and loss of life. We can apply the Fourth Amendment consistently,
objectively, and fairly and still recognize the simple truth that some
threats are graver than are others.
To recognize this plain and common-sense fact of life is not,
however, to deny that the Fourth Amendment does and should apply to
law enforcement search-and-seizure activities directed at everyoneanyone-suspected of committing a crime, any crime. The Fourth
Amendment does apply equally to everyone. But when the Fourth
Amendment applies and how the Fourth Amendment applies are separate
questions the answers to which are-and should remain-extremely
sensitive to the circumstances in which particular Fourth Amendment
encounters arise and the fashion in which those encounters are made.
This is the point where the competing arguments about the
application of Fourth Amendment principles in perilous times come
together. The Fourth Amendment applies-as it must if we are to

37.
38.

Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834, 843 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). See also

id. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). ("The dog sniff in this case, it bears emphasis, was
for drug detection only. A dog sniff for explosives, involving security interests not
presented here, would be an entirely different matter.").
39. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003).
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respect our laws and our constitutional history-to every search and
seizure (including arrests) made by law enforcement agents. But, the
Fourth Amendment also applies in a way that includes unhindered
sensitivity to and awareness of the context in which the law enforcement
activities in question have arisen. Indeed, it must apply in this way if we
are to be able to respond appropriately and effectively to the threats that
now imperil us.
The current wave of terroristic threats to the United States and to
our allies is real; it is neither hypothetical nor imagined.
The
extraordinary scope of the potential disasters portended by some of these
threats is also real. In the course of the entire American Revolution,
4,435 Americans lost their lives in battle. 40 But, in a single terrorist
attack alone, the attack on September 11, more than 3,000 individualsAmericans and citizens of other countries-lost their lives. 41 When one
recognizes that terrorist individuals and organizations undoubtedly seek
to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear materials to assist in their
assaults, the possibilities for even more dramatic losses of life are, of
course, staggering and horrific. And, sad to say, these grave threats to
us, to our nation, and to our national identity and character are not likely
to diminish any time soon.
Our response to such dire threats should not be-our response
cannot be-to ignore our own history, to ignore our own laws, or to
ignore our own constitutional principles. As the Supreme Court opined
in 1967, "[i]t would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense,
we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties ...

which

makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile. 42 Just last year, Justice
John Paul Stevens added "if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals
symbolized by its flag, it must not wield
the tools of tyrants even to resist
' 3
an assault by the forces of tyranny. A
As Justice O'Connor concluded in her plurality opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the 2004 decision wherein the Court made it clear that due
process requires that American citizens designated "enemy combatants"
nonetheless retain their constitutional rights to a meaningful opportunity
to contest the factual basis for their detention,
Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance
to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally
vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this
40. U.S. Dept. of Veteran's Affairs, America's Wars (Oct. 2003), available at
http://wwwl .va.gov/pressrellamwars.pdf
41.

See Paul Overberg, Final Sept. 11 death toll remains elusive, available at

http://www.usatoday.com/news/septl 1/2002-08-22-death-tollx.htm.
42. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
43.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2735 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It
is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our
Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is
in those times that we must preserve44our commitment at home to the
principles for which we fight abroad.
In Hamdi, Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting, underscored this same
point, adding that the Framers recognized the need to keep our
constitutional balance true, even in extremis:
The Founders well understood the difficult tradeoff between safety
and freedom. "Safety from external danger," [Alexander] Hamilton
declared, "is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even
the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war; the
continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger,
will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose
and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their
civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at length, become
willing to run the risk of being less free."...
The Founders warned us about the risk, and equipped us with a
Constitution designed to deal with it.
Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give
way to security in times of national crisis-that, at the extremes of
military exigency, inter arma silent leges. Whatever the general
merits of the view that war silences law or modulates its voice, that
view has no place in the interpretation and application of a
Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in4 5a manner that
accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.
Professor Heymann has counseled that "the challenge is not to beat
and stop terrorism. The trick is to do it in a way most consistent with the
values of a democratic society. ' 6 To do that, we need the courage of our
convictions. We need the common sense to realize the enormity of the
threats that face us, and we need the wisdom not to respond to these
threats in a partisan fashion or simply with grand-sounding rhetoric,

44.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).

See also Kennedy v.

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963) ("The imperative necessity for
safeguarding these rights to procedural due process under the gravest of emergencies has
existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies
of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with guarantees which, it is
feared, will inhibit government action.").
45.
46.

Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2674 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
HEYMANN, supra note 5,at 159.
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beautiful to the ear but insensitive to the realities (and the strategic
nuances) of the dangers that we face.
Such a balancing act is, of course, a tricky one, and sometimes there
will be elements of risk involved as well. But, fortunately, most criminal
cases involving law enforcement officers' Fourth Amendment activities
do not involve terrorists. They do not, thankfully, involve airplane highjackings or genocide or jihad or suicide bombers. The corollary of a
Fourth Amendment reasonableness doctrine that permits us to consider
the horror and enormity of such crimes in assessing, for example, the
presence of probable cause supporting an arrest or a search is that
lawyers and judges (and policy-makers) must continue to respect the
value of preserving Fourth Amendment rights and our constitutional
traditions. They must respect it even when it is painful to do so and even
when it hampers some activities undertaken by law enforcement officers,
actions that are sincerely intended (but not permitted) to fight crime...
and terrorism.
We can do this.
We can respect individual rights and we can protect ourselves-at
the very same time-from the awful threats that now face us. Indeed,
not only can we do this, it is, as Americans, precisely what we must do.

